Paper 1.

Brian O’Shaughnessy’s first concern in The Will is to determine what the conceptual limits on the will are. These limitations break down into two categories: limitations on what can be a willing and limitations on what can be willed. “Willing the movement of extra-bodily objects”, were it to be impossible, falls into the second category. O’Shaughnessy’s first inclination is to claim that it is indeed impossible to will the movement of an extra-bodily event. However, he believes this natural inclination is just a consequence of the fact that we don’t understand the meaning of claiming to will the movement of an extra-bodily object. Being “in a muddle”, we reject the notion. However, to get more solid answer to the question Is willing the movement of an extra-bodily object conceptually impossible?, O’Shaughnessy engages in a series of thought experiments and arguments to outline more the meaning of a claim to will such a movement.

In service of this, O’Shaughnessy offers a series of descriptions, α through ζ. Each one attempts to describe a willing of an extra-bodily object. Case γ illuminates one of the core problems of willing the movement of extra-bodily objects. In (γ), whenever a particular agent says, “Move” to an object, the object moves. Furthermore, he knows that it will move. When we ask him how he knows, he replies “I just know”. His knowledge is immediate, lacking a mediating element. In the previous case β, the agent knew through a kind of trial and error. Surely (γ) comes closer to describing our situation with bodily willings than does (β). However, there is still a problem with the description of knowledge in (γ).

The problem with this description of knowledge hinges on the ‘just’ in “I just know”. “Just” has a subtly different meaning here that prevents (γ) from being analogous to a bodily willing. The first distinction between “justs” is that of intuitive versus occult “just knowings”. The knowledge of intuitive just knowings have grounds which are unavailable at the moment to the speaker. However, occult just knowings have no such grounds. They can never become self-conscious knowings-in-a-way, like intuitive knowings might. Both case (γ) and bodily actions seem to fall under occult knowings, so that will not help us in looking for a distinction. However, the distinction we are looking for is near by. While both types of knowledge are “irremediably immediate” in their groundings, only bodily actions, and the knowledge of them, are explicable. There is a clear causal chain that explains how bodily movements occur, and presumably also causes the knowledge of them in some way. Even though this knowledge is immediate and groundless, it still has a cause. This is more than can be said for (γ).

An even bigger problem with these examples of extra-bodily willing is that there is no act-trigger. Even if O’Shaughnessy were to grant that somehow someone could come up with a case in which the knowledge of the movement of an extra-bodily object was exactly analogous to the knowledge of a bodily movement, he would still object to the lack of an act-trigger. What is an act-trigger? It is a change in the agent that is the cause or related to the cause of the movement which he immediately knows. It seems to be closely related, although perhaps not identical, to an intention. The basic idea is that there has to be some power line, some connection between the object and the agent for there to be a willing. Otherwise, the agent is just a mystic, a fortune-teller of sorts.

The third difficulty that arose in considering these cases is the lack of feeling. O’Shaughnessy is baffled by the idea of someone lacking all feeling in a limb, yet being able to move it, write with it, and, all the while, know what it was doing. Our immediate knowledge of our bodily actions seems to be contingent on having feeling in the limb that we are moving. The essential problem here is not that one lacks knowledge of limb position by lacking feeling in it. For the man with the anesthetized limb could look at it and know its location in space with great precision. It is the feeling-based immediate awareness that is essential to a willing.

We have progressed in our evaluation of the claim to will the movement of an extra-bodily object. We are in possession of three clear reasons why such a claim is impossible. In all the cases of willing the movement of an extra-bodily object, the agent has a different kind of knowledge than does an agent who wills a bodily movement. Although both are immediate and ungrounded, the knowledge of agent who wills a bodily movement is explicable through a cause. In all the cases examined, the agent who wills the movement of an extra-bodily object does not have an active internal change that causes the external change in some way. He lacks a power line to the extra-bodily object. Finally, in cases of willing the movement of extra-bodily objects, the agent lacks feeling in the object and this makes being aware (in a technical sense) of its movements impossible. Here, then, are three characteristics of action that all bodily movements share and all extra-bodily movements lack. We are closer to a description of the necessary conditions for an object to be able to be the object of a willing.

Study Questions for Chapter 3

1. What does O’Shaughnessy mean by “spiritualizing” bodily action? How, initially (i.e. section 1), how this present a problem?

“Spiritualizing” bodily actions means to define bodily actions exclusively by the mental phenomena that precede the bodily manifestations of such actions, and ignore the physical aspect of action. When one spiritualizes bodily actions, the problems and confusion inherent in speaking of “willing beyond the confines of the body” disappear. Of course, someone who spiritualizes bodily actions is not likely to view extra-bodily willing as especially confusing or mysterious, so O’Shaughnessy’s point has limited applicability.

2. Describe three distinct uses of “I cannot move my so-and-so” (where “so-and-so” is some bodily part) — along with paradigm occasions for the use of that expression in that way.

θ₁ – “I can do x” if no external forces prevent me from doing x and no external forces prevent me from doing x and I need no instrument to do x. θ₂ – “I can do x” if no external forces prevent me from doing x and I need no instrument to do x. θ₃ – “I can do x” if no external forces prevent me from doing x but I need an instrument to do x. θ₁ is used for common cases of moving one’s arms and legs. θ₂ might be used if one was temporarily unable to move one’s arms, because they were pinned to the ground, but otherwise, there were no impediments to movement. θ₃ is used for instrumentally-willed cases, like turning off the TV with the remote.

3. O’Shaughnessy claims: (IF θ1, THEN θ2) and NOT(IF θ2, THEN θ1).
But he also accepts (IF(θ2 + ?), THEN θ1). What goes in the place of “?” to make a principle that O’Shaughnessy accepts?

If we rewrite the phrases above as logical statements, then O’Shaughnessy’s claims can be seen clearly. “I can do” = Do(x). “No external forces prevent me from doing” = ~External(x). “I need no instrument to do” = ~Instrument(x). So, θ₁ is ~Instrument(x) ^ ~External(x) ^ (~External(x) à Do(x)). θ₂ is ~Instrument(x) ^ (~External(x) à Do(x)). The difference between these two is that θ₁ includes the term ~External(x) in its conjunction. Thus, to be able to conclude θ₁ from θ₂, one just needs to conjoin ~External(x) to θ₂. In O’Shaughnessy’s words, ~External(x) is “liberty does prevail”.

4. By your lights, what would be involved in trying to move the sun—just by willing it?

First of all, “just by willing” indicates that the willing is non-instrumental in nature. Non-instrumentally willing the Sun to move is a very strange idea. However, I think it would involve A) desiring that the Sun move in a certain direction; B) the willed direction cannot be the direction the Sun is currently moving; C) intending the Sun to move in the desired direction; D) the Sun moving in the intended direction; E) the agent feeling as though he were responsible for the movement of the Sun; and F) there be some sort of causal connection between the intention of the agent and the movement of the Sun.

5. What’s the difference between instrumental trying and trying according to the “model use,” which makes the latter problematic?

Instrumental tryings are type θ₃, while “model” tryings are type θ₂. The difference between them is that type θ₂ tryings do not involve any instruments, but type θ₃ tryings do. Since θ₂₃), but not non-instrumentally, for we lack a direct causal connection to the movement of extra-bodily objects. tryings do not involve any instruments, when one is asked, in the “model” sense, to will the movement of an extra-bodily object (like the Sun), one is bewildered. We can imagine moving the Sun instrumentally (θ

6. (Section 2.) O’Shaughnessy is relying on a distinction between intensions and extensions. What is the difference? What is the intension of a word? What is the extension of a word? What would it be to hold the view that intensions determine extensions?

The intension of a term x is the definition of x, and the extension of x is the set of all objects that are x’s. The differences between intensions and extensions are numerous: epistemological (we can know one without knowing the other), extensions are sets of objects, while intensions make no reference to objects. Intensions are propositions, and extensions are not. The view that intensions determine extensions is the view that, once one knows the intension of a term, one can deduce the extension of the term.

7. Reconstruct and display perspicuously, premise by premise, the argument that is behind the volitionist linguistic reform (p. 75).

Actions are mental phenomena, directed beyond the mental. Thus, the object of an action must be conceived in the mind. The subject is aware of what he is acting upon, according to some description he gives. There is a unity of intention and willing in the mind of the subject. These “instrumental actions” are sequential causes, i.e. limb movement à e1 à e2. Given the unity of intention within the subject’s mind, only one of the three events can be the action. The preference is then given for the limb movement to be the action, because conceptual space is needed for the cases of extra-bodily willing, whereby the subject sends out psychic waves of some sort and directly causes e2, without using limb movements.

8. What is nominalism (p. 82)?

Nominalism is the belief that there are no Platonic abstract types in the ontology of the universe. Thus, a nominalist would believe that there are instances of willing, but no abstract “willing” object above and beyond those instances.

9. Explain and argue for the claim that “killings are necessarily instrumental, while only a few arm raisings are instrumental” (p 85).

Although there are a multiplicity of methods of killing, just as there are many ways to die, they all fall under the heading of being instrumentally willed when willed. Clearly, any killing of another person would be instrumental, as one would have to move one’s body in some way to kill another. Even one’s own death would be necessarily instrumental. If one wished to commit suicide, then one would have decide on a cause of death. One could not just will to be dead, and Boom! be dead. However, one can just will to raise one’s arm and Boom! one’s arm is raised (in at least some cases).

10. (A crucial discussion.) What does O’Shaughnessy say that your “just knowing” that Φ will occur is “opaque” but “explicable”?

There are at least two ways to classify knowings. Each way separates knowings into two camps. The first separation is between explicable and inexplicable. This separation refers to the idea of some “just knowings” are, although unknown to the actor, theoretically explainable. Occult knowings are inexplicable: no rational, scientific explanation exists for such knowings. The first separation is between opaque and transparent. O’Shaughnessy, frustratingly, never discusses what he means by these metaphorical terms. However, they do seem connected to the previous distinction. Transparent knowings seem to mean that although the actor doesn’t know what explains his knowing (a depth nature of sorts), he can point to the markers that allow him to know. Opaque knowings lack markers of this sort: they are just known.

11. What does O’Shaughnessy mean by “aesthetic” in referring on page 102 to “the ordinary aesthetic situation”?

Aesthetic usually means “relating to the beautiful” or “beautiful”. However, in this case, it appears to have a completely different meaning. O’Shaughnessy is using the archaic meaning of aesthetic: “sensation” or “feeling”. (Ref: Dictionary.com)

12. After all those other cases, where does O’Shaughnessy get off saying of his last case (the rubber hand) that it “suffers from the defect of being altogether too fantastic”? What’s the special problem with that case?

The objectionable part of the rubber-hand case is the lack of any sensible mechanism connecting the willing to the rubber hand. From what we know of the human nervous system, it could not act upon rubber.

12. The objectionable part of the rubber-hand case is the lack of any sensible mechanism connecting the willing to the rubber hand. From what we know of the human nervous system, it could not act upon rubber.

Study Questions: Chapter 2

1. (§ 1) O’Shaughnessy says that he is inclined to say that there is an a priori limit to extending the will beyond the body, but he is not inclined to say that there is a logical limit to extending the will beyond the body. That seems to be a contradiction—but isn’t. Why not? What’s the difference? (You may have to wait until you’ve read the whole chapter to fully answer this, but take a first shot at it here.)

[For this assignment, willing an event external to the body will be abbreviated as willing_eb.] A logical limit to willing_eb means that the statement, “One cannot will an event external to the body” is a necessary truth. An a priori limit is quite different for O’Shaughnessy. As I understand it, an a priori limit is a limit on our own faculties. Prior to any experience, we cannot even understand what it would mean to will_eb. Now this could have two different conclusions, and I am not sure which one O’Shaughnessy intends. The first is this argument: If there was a logical limit to willing_eb, then we would be able to understand what it meant to will an event external to the body. However, since we cannot understand that (thus, there is an a priori limit on willing_eb), there is not a logical limit on willing_eb. The second possible conclusion is that since we cannot understand what it would mean to will_eb, we cannot know what the logical status of willing_eb.

2. (§ 2) In your own words, explain how a natural-kind term comes to be. (This is important for the whole chapter and for much of philosophy. Spend some time getting this right.)

A natural-kind term comes to exist when a speaker stumbles across a thing x that he does not have a term for already. Using some set of markers, he realizes that it is different in some way and invents or comes to use (from social convention) that term for things like x. Note that the vital part of this is the initial tagging, and the term “X”, when the chips are down, does not refer to the epistemological markers that clued him in that x was different, but rather the x itself. O’Shaughnessy writes of a “stable bond” that must form between the term and the designatum (or x).

3. What is the difference between criteria for a term and “markers” (pointers) for its application? (this may not be clear to you until page 58.)

It seems the criteria for a term are the propositions that form the term’s intension. The epistemological markers for application are quite different. They are the properties that clue us in that a term’s designatum fits into the term we have linked to it. Although a term first comes to exist through our apprehension of the markers, the term’s intension rarely matches up exactly to the markers. For example, the markers for “gold” might be that it originates from rocks and is a shiny yellow. Through modern chemistry, we know that the intension of “gold” is having an atomic number of 79.

4. What are “contextual considerations” that play a role in determining the application of a natural-kind term? (O’Shaughnessy introduces this expression on page 40, but it doesn’t become clear for some pages. § 2 sub-section 3 (pp. 41–2) helps; but especially p. 45. You’ll have to tease it out of the text.)

“Contextual considerations” refers to the general categories that things surrounding the x belong to. O’Shaughnessy gives the example of resin (among others): contextual considerations include noting the fact that the x’s that are resin originate from y’s that are trees. The fact that these originate from y’s that are trees serves as an epistemological marker. Thus, to expand the term is certainly to be injudicious (see question 5). Also, it tends to convey that the speaker failed to grasp the markers in the first place.

5. (§ 3) What’s the difference between an injudicious use of a natural-kind term and its misuse? Your answer should explain why “sheer disregard of the epistemological ‘markers’ does not guarantee that one misuses a natural-kind term” (44).

There are two ways to misuse a term. The first is through deceit: using a known and socially accepted word as that word without intending to convey its intension. The other way is through a mistake. One might use a known and socially accepted word but not as that word, thus misusing it. Injudicious use is using a word without regard for its markers. These may or may not line up. However, it is possible for an injudicious use to also be a correct use. For example, one might know the intension of the term and use that to apply the term, rather than the markers. It is entirely impossible for a misuse to be a correct use.

6. O’Shaughnessy gestures at two cases of misuse: “the case in which one mistakenly thinks one knows the meaning of a word and the case in which one uses a word to stand for what one thinks it does not designate … Agreement or not with fact is irrelevant” (43). Give your own examples of these two cases and explain why “agreement or not with fact is irrelevant.”

An example of one misusing a term through mistaken understanding is the following: If one thinks that “gold” refers to silver, then one would be misusing a term to point at something that one believed to be silver and call it “gold”. An example of one understanding the term but misusing it to mislead others would be a miner who pointed at some pyrite (fool’s gold) and called it “gold”, knowing what “gold” signifies. Agreement with fact is irrelevant, and we can see this if we change the examples so that the speaker is accidentally correct. The silver that the speaker pointed at in the original example might be white gold. However, since he used “gold” to refer what he believed was silver, he misused “gold”. In the other example, the liar might actually be a horrible geologist and truly be pointing at gold. However, since he believed that it was not gold, and called it “gold”, he misused the term “gold”.

7. (§ 4) What are the “markers” of physical action? (Again, what is a “marker”?) Which of these “markers” amounts to a “contextual requirement” and why? (Again, what is “contextual setting”?)

The markers for physical action seem to be: A) movement B) which is in a suitable region of the body C) of an animal D) which matches a desire for the movement to occur E) and matches an intention for the movement to occur and F) an activish phenomenology. (B), and possibly (C) are contextual considerations which act as markers in this case. These are contextual considerations because it is in the context of animal bodily movement that willing occurs. Interestingly, these are also the markers which are at the heart of the question O’Shaughnessy is asking: “Can extra-bodily movements be willed?” This might be rewritten as “Can a willing exist which lacks markers B and C?”

8. (§ 5) Does “the will can/cannot be extended beyond the body” have a sense? Explain.

It might have a sense, but we don’t know if it does or not. A proposition has a sense if it is possible for it to occur. And since we don’t even know if willing_eb is logically possible, clearly we don’t know if it has a sense or not. All that O’Shaughnessy is comfortable asserting at this point is that anyone who claims that if willing_eb is logically possible or impossible is misusing “willing”. This would indicate that my second conclusion in question 1 is the one favored by O’Shaughnessy.

9. In your own words, what is “theory of meaning criticized by Putnam” (57)?

The theory that Putnam criticizes is a sort of Platonism. In this theory, it would seem that the definition of acquiring term x is to comprehend the intension of x. And once one comprehends the intension of x, one automatically knows the extension of x. According to Putnam, however, one acquires x through various markers from an original instantiation of x which may or may not correspond to the intension of x.

10. (page 58.) Go back to question 3.

Criteria are the propositions which form the intension of a concept. They are the "necesities": an x is not an x if it doesn't meet these criteria, and it is an x in virtue of these criteria. This is the only way to make sense of O'Shaughnessy's statements on pp 58-59.